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The Founding Fathers added the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution guaranteeing that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech,”1 as a result of states’ fears that a federal government may try 
to restrict state independence based on colonial experiences under British rule.2  
However, Congress has passed several statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 875, that 
allow for the conviction of individuals based solely on their speech.3  While the 
Supreme Court has upheld 18 U.S.C. § 875 in determining that certain types of 
speech including “true threats” are not protected by the First Amendment, the 
debate continues as to whether forms of artistry and expression, such as rap 
music, are protected.4 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2 The Bill of Rights: A Brief History, ACLU (Mar. 4, 2002), 
https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-reform_immigrants-
rights/bill-rights-brief-history. 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012). 
 4 See Sarah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed: School and Judicial Analysis in 
Need of Redirection, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 663, 679 (2003) (identifying true threats as a 
category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment); About The First Amend-
ment, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about-the-first-
amendment (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
396 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
Anthony Elonis posted these rap lyrics to his public Facebook page between 
October and November 2010: 
You know your shit’s ridiculous when/you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door/Little 
Agent Lady stood so close/Took all the strength I had not to turn/the bitch ghost/…/So 
the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant/And bring yo’ SWAT and an 
explosives/expert while you’re at it/Cause little did y’all know, I was/strapped wit’ a 
bomb/…/I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me/and pat me down/Touch the deto-
nator in my pocket and/we’re all goin’/[BOOM!]5 
This post, and others, caused Elonis’s arrest in December 2010 for violating 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c).6 
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) makes it illegal for any person who “trans-
mits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any 
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another.”7  The 
consequences under this criminal statute include a fine and up to five years of 
imprisonment.8  After he was convicted under this statute, Elonis was sen-
tenced to forty-four months’ imprisonment with a subsequent three-year super-
vised release.9 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis’s convic-
tion.10  Elonis then petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, which 
the Court granted on June 16, 2014.11  In his Petition to the Court, Elonis ar-
gued that the test under 18 U.S.C. § 875 is outdated and should explicitly re-
quire a subjective intent to threaten.12  Elonis further claimed that his Facebook 
posts are protected speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.13 
If Elonis’s Facebook posts are considered “true threats,” they would no 
longer constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.14  Per the Third 
                                                
 5 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 6 Id. at 323-26. 
 7 § 875(c). 
 8 Id. 
 9 730 F.3d at 327. 
 10 Id. at 335. 
 11 Id. at 321, cert. granted, 82 USLW 3538 (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-983); Elonis v. 
United States, SCOTUSBLOG, www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/elonis-v-united-states/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (mentioning that arguments are scheduled for December 1, 
2014). 
 12 730 F.3d at 327 
A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a 
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that 
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the 
life of an individual. 
Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, 21, United States v. Elonis, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) 
(No. 13-983). 
 13 730 F.3d at 327; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14 United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012); see Redfield, supra note 
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Circuit, a “true threat” occurs when a speaker intentionally makes a statement 
that a reasonable person could foresee to be understood by the subject of the 
speech as a “serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take 
the life of an individual.”15  To determine whether these words constitute a 
“true threat,” it is important to consider the medium through which the words 
were conveyed.16 
Currently, there is a split amongst the courts as to whether the test for true 
threats includes subjective intent.17  Additionally, courts are split regarding 
what constitutes “subjective intent.”  Some courts hold that a true threat analy-
sis should include an individual’s subjective intent to place speech in interstate 
or foreign commerce.18  Other courts evaluate a speaker’s subjective intent to 
threaten when placing their speech into interstate or foreign commerce.19  
                                                                                                             
4 (identifying true threats as a category of speech that is not protected by the First Amend-
ment). 
 15 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327 
A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a 
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that 
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the 
life of an individual. 
 16 Id. 327-28 
[A] true threat requires that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or 
oral, in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker com-
municates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm 
upon or to take the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of 
mistake, duress, or coercion. 
(quoting United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 17 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (stating that earlier 
cases found the willfulness requirement fulfilled when a person voluntarily uttered the 
charged words with an intention to carry out the act, but there are still doubts from the Court 
of its interpretation); see, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and to consider whether a 
reasonable person “would believe that the statement was made as a serious expression of 
intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (holding that because of First Amendment concerns, specific intent to carry out a 
threat is required to prosecute). 
 18 See, e.g., 394 U.S. at 707-08 (stating that earlier cases found the willfulness require-
ment fulfilled when a person voluntarily uttered the charged words with an intention to carry 
out the act, but there are still doubts from the Court of its interpretation); see, e.g., 692 F.3d 
at 477 (instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and to consider 
whether a reasonable person “would believe that the statement was made as a serious ex-
pression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., 534 F.2d at 1026 (holding that because 
of First Amendment concerns, specific intent to carry out a threat is required to prosecute). 
 19 See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-
983) (stating that the Fourth Circuit confirms that a true threat is not protected by the First 
Amendment if there is intent (citing United States v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 
1966))); see also Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
2819 (2014) (No. 13-983) (citing United States v. Bagdasarian) 
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Meanwhile, other courts look at the objective intent of the individual who re-
ceives the speech.20 
However, in deciding whether a social media post constitutes a “true threat,” 
intent is not the determinative factor.21  Instead, the manner in which the 
speech is posted on a social media website should determine whether a true 
threat exists under 18 U.S.C. § 875 and is thus unprotected speech.22  To im-
prove the test for true threats, courts should consider the directness of the 
threat in conjunction with the actual fear of the recipient.  The creation of a 
stronger test will allow courts to better distinguish true threats, like those em-
bodied in 18 U.S.C. § 875, from protected speech under the First Amend-
ment.23 
                                                                                                             
[T]he Ninth Circuit resolved any uncertainty that might remain from its previous 
practice by holding that, under Black, ‘only intentional threats are criminally punish-
able consistent[] with the First Amendment’… that court held, ‘the subjective test set 
forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech’; it is 
‘not sufficient that objective observers would reasonably perceive such speech as a 
threat.’ 
Id.; see also id. at 5 (noting that the Seventh Circuit recognized that Black undermines its 
position (citing United States v. Parr)); see, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (noting that, with 
some doubts, the Court believes lower courts to be correct, that “[s]ome early cases found 
the willfulness requirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with 
‘an apparent determination to carry them into execution’”); see, e.g., Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 
477 (instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) in consideration of 
“whether in light of the context a reasonable person would believe that the statement was 
made as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., Kelner, 534 F.2d at 
1026 (holding that because of First Amendment concerns, a specific intent to carry out a 
threat is required to prosecute). 
 20 See Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3 Elonis, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-983) (stating that 
the Third Circuit looks to “whether the defendant intended to threaten someone was irrele-
vant: As the government explained, ‘it doesn’t matter what he thinks.’ All that mattered was 
whether ‘the defendant intentionally ma[d]e a statement…under such circumstances where-
in a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted’ as a threat” 
(quoting United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991))); see, e.g., 394 U.S. at 
707-08 (“Some early cases found the willfulness requirement met if the speaker voluntarily 
uttered the charged words with ‘an apparent determination to carry them into execution.’ 
The majority below seemed to agree. Perhaps this interpretation is correct, although we have 
grave doubts about it.”); see, e.g., 692 F.3d at 477-78 (instructing the jury to convict Jeffries 
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether in light of the context a reasonable person would be-
lieve that the statement was made as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); 
see, e.g., 534 F.2d at 1026 (holding that because of First Amendment concerns, a specific 
intent to carry out a threat is required to prosecute). 
 21 PAUL J. LARKING & JORDAN RICHARDSON, THE HERITAGE FOUND., TRUE THREATS AND 
THE LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 5 (Dec. 8, 2014), available at 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM142.pdf. 
 22 Id. at 9 (noting that while it is easier to attribute intent to spoken word, it is not as 
clear when messages are posted on Facebook as “personal thoughts and musings”). 
 23 See Determining the Legality of a Threat, NUREMBERG FILES, 
http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/nuremberg-files/legal.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2014) (citing an Amicus Curiae brief of the ACLU of Oregon urging a series of 
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It is not necessary to include a subjective intent test in determining whether 
a true threat exists under 18 U.S.C. § 875.  Instead, the United States Supreme 
Court should adopt the objective intent standard to determine whether a true 
threat exists. Objective intent focuses on the directness of a threat to a particu-
lar victim.  The standard therefore evaluates whether a reasonable person in the 
place of the victim would feel threatened.  If answered affirmatively, a true 
threat exists. 
This Note specifically focuses on social media posts.  In an Internet context, 
the speaker’s intent is easily lost in translation, as the recipient of the speech 
may place their own emphasis on words that they never directly heard.  There-
fore, Part I of this Note details First Amendment protections for speech and 
argues that the manner of speech is the most important part of any true threat 
test through a discussion of protected speech and the impact location has on 
any available speech protections.  Part II of this Note then examines the legis-
lative history of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and different definitions of “intent” utilized 
by the courts in providing the context necessary to understand Anthony Elo-
nis’s conviction and the determinative nature of speech formatting in a social 
media context in a test for true threats.  Subsequently, Part III analyzes Elonis 
v. United States in greater detail.  Elonis then serves as a model to demonstrate 
that social media threats are easier to analyze when courts have a greater focus 
on the way in which speech is disseminated.  Finally, Part V discusses the 
practical implications that could ensue should the Supreme Court adopt the 
subjective intent to threaten instead of the objective intent test in conjunction 
with a focus on directness. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
A. Protected Speech 
The United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law… 
abridging the freedom of speech.”24  Freedom of speech protects an individu-
al’s ability to voice his or her own views and opinions.25  These views and 
opinions are what make up the “marketplace of ideas”26 and allows for the 
                                                                                                             
considerations to determine a “true threat,” such as whether a reasonable person would per-
ceive a statement as a threat, and whether the threat was directed to a person or a group of 
people). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25 DAVID S. SCHWARTZ & LORI A. RINGHAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEXT AND 
PRACTICE CASEBOOK 938 (2013) (“‘Speech’ . . . includes spoken or written expression . . . 
the Court has extended it to other conduct intended to convey ideas or information.”). 
 26 See id. at 939. 
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quintessential functioning of the representative democracy that makes up the 
United States government.27 
The Court worries about restrictions that pose a risk to free speech.28  For 
example, “criminal prohibitions on pure speech a[re] [a] ‘matter of special 
concern’…because ‘[t]he severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speak-
ers to remain silent rather than communicate . . . .’”29  Moreover, “[t]he mere 
‘threat of criminal prosecution . . . can inhibit the speaker from making [law-
ful] statements,’ thereby chilling ‘speech that lies at the First Amendment’s 
heart.’”30  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that ‘“negligence…is [a] 
constitutionally insufficient’ standard for imposing liability for speech.” 31  
Thus, it is clear that protecting free speech is of the utmost importance to the 
Supreme Court. 
B. Unprotected Speech 
While it is important to protect an individual’s ability to voice his or her 
views and opinions, this does not imply that all speech is protected.32  For ex-
ample, obscenities,33 child pornography,34 libel,35 fighting words,36 incitement to 
violence,37 and true threats, are not protected by the First Amendment.38 
                                                
 27 See id. (“Those who won our independence believed…that public discussion is a 
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.” 
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1925))). 
 28 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 3. 
 29 Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-872 (1997)). 
 30 Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., con-
curring)). 
 31 Id.; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288 (1964). 
 32 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1941). 
 33 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that speech or expression is 
considered obscene if it “appeals to the prurient interest . . . depicts or describes, in a patent-
ly offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and . . . 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
 34 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (detailing that child pornography 
is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 35 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254. 
 36 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (detailing that fighting words are “those which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” and are 
not protected by the First Amendment). 
 37 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (detailing that speech that’s pur-
pose is to incite or produce imminent lawless action and likely to actually incite or cause 
such action is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 38 See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that true 
threats are not protected by the First Amendment); see also Redfield, supra note 4 (identify-
ing several categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment). 
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1. True Threats 
Yet even the Supreme Court directly struggles with what some of these re-
strictions truly mean.39  During oral arguments in Elonis v. United States, Jus-
tice Kennedy noted that he is “not sure that the Court did either the law or the 
English language much of a good service when it said ‘true threat,’”40 and fur-
ther stated that “it’s a most unhelpful phrase.”41  During his oral argument, 
John P. Elwood, Anthony Elonis’s attorney, concluded that “true threat” is 
confusing because “it was announced in a per curium decision that didn’t have 
the benefit of merits, briefing, or argument.”42 
Despite the lack of clarity in the definition of true threat, many courts have 
stated that true threats are “statements where the speaker means to communi-
cate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to 
a particular individual or individuals.”43  This definition also focuses on the 
response to the speech and therefore evaluates whether the speech causes a risk 
of violence, fear, or disruption to the recipient’s normal activities.44  However, 
as Justice Kennedy has poignantly pointed out, a true threat could mean that 
the speaker “really intend[s] to carry it out,…really intend[s] to intimidate the 
person; or that no one could possibly believe it.”45  Thus, it is clear that there is 
even confusion within the Supreme Court as to what a true threat actually is. 
2. Location, Location, Location: The Place Where Speech Occurs Determines 
the Level of Protection it Receives 
a. Traditional Public Fora 
The location of speech can determine whether or not the speech is protect-
ed.46  For instance, in a traditional public forum, individuals generally have 
                                                
 39 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) 
(No. 13-983), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-983_bq7d.pdf. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 4. 
 43 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 44 United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The threat alone is disrup-
tive of the recipient’s sense of personal safety and well-being and is the true gravamen of 
the offense.” (quoting United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1991))). 
 45 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39. 
 46 See generally Sarah H. Duggin, Constitutional Law II Lecture 15-17 (Oct. 15, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Author); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (noting that the standards of free speech analysis “dif-
fer depending on the character of the property at issue”). 
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unhindered access to utilize protected speech.47  In traditional public fora, 
speech cannot be restricted merely because of its content or viewpoint; howev-
er, it can possibly be limited by reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.48  
Furthermore, if another type of restriction is placed on protected speech in a 
public fora that is serving a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailed to 
meet that interest, the restriction may be deemed constitutional, even though 
there is a general notion that individuals can speak freely and openly.49  Side-
walks, for example, are generally considered public fora.50 
b. Designated Public Fora 
Additionally, there are designated public fora.51  Designated public fora exist 
when the government voluntarily opens a place that it could normally close to 
speech.52  Generally, the Court applies the rules for traditional public fora to 
such areas during periods without censorship.53  Designated public fora include 
locations such as meeting rooms at state universities.54 Such meetings rooms 
can be used for uninhibited speech with the permission of the state run univer-
sity.55 
                                                
 47 See id. at 45 (discussing the strict scrutiny standard used to analyze regulation of 
speech in traditional public forums such as streets and parks); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703, 729-30 (2000) (holding that a ban on approaching within eight feet of a person 
who was within 100 feet of a health care facility was reasonable and narrowly tailored be-
cause even though it prohibited leafleting, it left “ample room to communicate a message 
through speech”). 
 48 460 U.S. at 45; see generally Duggin, supra note 46, at 16 (listing examples of rea-
sonable time place or manner restrictions on public forms as loudspeaker restrictions, regu-
lations of demonstrations to avoid safety and traffic problems, regulation of overnight sleep-
ing in city parks, and clinic buffer zones). 
 49 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 50 See generally Duggin, supra note 46 (listing examples of reasonable time place or 
manner restrictions on public forms as loudspeaker restrictions, regulations of demonstra-
tions to avoid safety and traffic problems, regulation of overnight sleeping in city parks, and 
clinic buffer zones); see also 460 U.S. at 45 (discussing the strict scrutiny standard used to 
analyze regulation of speech in traditional public forums such as streets and parks); see also 
Hill, 530 U.S. at 729-30 (holding that a ban on approaching within eight feet of a person 
who was within 100 feet of a health care facility was reasonable and narrowly tailored be-
cause even though it prohibited leafleting, it left “ample room to communicate a message 
through speech”). 
 51 See generally Duggin, supra note 46; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 52 See Duggin, supra note 46, at 17; 460 U.S. at 45-46. 
 53 See Duggin, supra note 46, at 17; 460 U.S. at 45-46 (1983). 
 54 Id. at 37-38 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 280 (1981)). 
 55 See, e.g., id. at 37. 
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c. Limited Public Fora 
Limited public fora are locations reserved for “certain groups or for the dis-
cussion of certain topics.”56  In a limited public forum, it is permissible for 
speech to be restricted based on subject matter so long as the restrictions are 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.57  For example, should an individual want to 
speak at a public school, it has been determined that it is acceptable for the 
school to restrict where, at what times, and in which ways speech may occur.58 
d. Private Property 
Furthermore, on private property, free speech can be restricted to a much 
greater degree.59  Despite the varying degrees of availability for protected 
speech, in large part caused by the variety of different fora, unprotected 
speech, such as true threats, is never permissible.60  Therefore, statutes are of-
ten used to criminalize unprotected speech, regardless of where the speech oc-
curs.61  Eighteen U.S.C. § 875, the statute under which Anthony Elonis was 
convicted due to his alleged unprotected speech, is one such statute.62 
III. 18 U.S.C. § 875(C): A STATUTE LIMITING SPEECH THAT 
CONSTITUTES TRUE THREATS 
Eighteen U.S.C. § 875(c) is a statute that places restrictions on free speech 
fora.63  This statute makes it illegal to “transmit in interstate or foreign com-
                                                
 56 See Duggin, supra note 46, at 18; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98, 107 (2001). 
 57 See Duggin, supra note 46, at 18; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. 
 58 Id. at 107. 
 59 See Duggin, supra note 46, at 18; see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57-
58 (1994) (holding that a city cannot ban individuals’ speech on their own property). 
 60 Cf. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a 
threat’s “language and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so 
as to” constitute more than protected speech); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107 (demon-
strating that a public high school could establish a limited public forum for after-school 
clubs and programs if the censorship by the school is not based on the organization’s view-
point or position). 
 61 See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 322 (1974) (upholding a 
restriction of advertising space on public buses to commercial ads rather than political ads); 
see 533 U.S. at 107 (demonstrating that a public high school could establish a limited public 
forum for after-school clubs and programs if the censorship by the school is not based on the 
organization’s viewpoint or position). 
 62 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2013); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012). 
 63 § 875. 
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merce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any 
threat to injure the person of another.”64 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c): History and Legislative Intent 
This statute was originally intended to prevent the use of mail to transmit 
threats for the purpose of extortion.65  This was largely due to a number of high 
profile extortion threats that occurred during that time. 66   As technology 
changed, Congress continued to amend this statute.67 For instance, in 1939, 
Public Law 76-76, the Act on which 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is based, was expand-
ed to encompass non-extortionist threats as well.68  Additionally, the statute 
was further broadened to include other forms of communication, such as the 
telephone and telegraph.69 
The background of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is important because some argue that 
the amendment of this Act removed a requirement of a subjective intent to 
                                                
 64 Id. 
 65 See Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-274, 47 Stat. 649, 649 (1932) 
Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, 
shall knowingly deposit or cause to be deposited in any post office or station . . . 
any written or printed letter or other communication . . . addressed to any other 
person, and containing any threat (1) to injure the person, property, or reputation 
of the addressee or of another . . . or (2) to kidnap any person, or (3) to accuse the 
addressee or any other person of a crime, or containing any demand or request for 
ransom or reward for the real ease of any kidnapped person, shall be fined not 
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
Id. 
 66 Thomas DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-only Approach to 
12 U.S.C. § 875(c) in light of United States v. Jeffries and the norms of online social net-
working, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 995 (Winter 2014) (noting that the passage of the original 
Act which 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is based on was motivated in large part by the kidnapping of 
Charles Lindbergh’s son and the kidnappers’ use of mail to relay their threats). 
 67 See Act of May 15, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-76, § 2(b), 53 Stat. 742, 744 (1939) (stating 
that “[w]hoever shall transmit in interstate commerce by any means whatsoever any com-
munication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of 
another shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both”); see also DeBauche, supra note 66, at 996 nn.110 & 111 (citing S. Rep. No. 73-533 
that states “this bill supplements the Patterson Act, which makes it a Federal criminal of-
fense to transmit threats through the mails,” by adding “the telephone, telegraph, radio, and 
other means of conveyance” to the ways in which threats cannot legally be administered). 
 68 See § 2(b), 53 Stat. at 744 (stating that “[w]hoever shall transmit in interstate com-
merce by any means whatsoever any communication containing any threat to kidnap any 
person or any threat to injure the person of another shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both”). 
 69 DeBauche, supra note 66, at 996 nn.110 & 111 (citing S. Rep. No. 73-533 that states 
“this bill supplements the Patterson Act, which makes it a Federal criminal offense to 
transmit threats through the mails,” by adding “the telephone, telegraph, radio, and other 
means of conveyance” to the ways in which threats cannot legally be administered). 
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threaten.70  Others argue that the statute “should cover words that might be ob-
jectively perceived as threatening when the speaker did not actually intend to 
have a threatening effect on a particular target.”71  This ambiguity, due to con-
gressional changes, caused the division amongst the courts at issue today. 
B. Division Amongst the Courts: Intent to Threaten Requirement 
The disagreement in the proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) has led 
to great division amongst the courts.72  Some circuits hold that the speech 
should be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person in the place of 
the speech’s recipient.73  Other circuits find that the subjective intent of the 
speaker, rather than the recipient, should be used to determine whether a true 
threat exists.74  Finally, some circuits require a finding of a speaker’s subjective 
intent to threaten.75 
                                                
 70 Id. at 996 (citing United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, 
J., dubitante)). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 2. 
 73 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 2-3 (stating that the Third Circuit looks to 
“whether the defendant intended to threaten someone was irrelevant: As the government 
explained, ‘it doesn’t matter what he thinks.’ All that mattered was whether ‘the defendant 
intentionally ma[d]e a statement . . . under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted’ as a threat”); see, e.g., Watts v. Unit-
ed States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (“Some early cases found the willfulness require-
ment met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with ‘an apparent determina-
tion to carry them into execution.’ The majority below seemed to agree.  Perhaps this inter-
pretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it.”); see, e.g., United States v. 
Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2012) (instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether in light of the context a reasonable person would believe that 
the statement was made as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., 
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a specific intent to 
carry out a threat is required to prosecute, where the threat’s “language and context con-
veyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to” constitute more than pro-
tected speech) 
 74 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 20 (stating that the Fourth Circuit con-
firms that  “18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires a showing that a threat was intended”); Reply Brief 
for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 2-3 
[T]he Ninth Circuit resolved any uncertainty that might remain from its previous 
practice by holding that, under [Virginia v. Black], ‘only intentional threats are crim-
inally punishable consistent with the First Amendment’… that court held, ‘the sub-
jective test set forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize 
pure speech’; it is ‘not sufficient that objective observers would reasonably perceive 
such speech as a threat.’ 
Id.; see also id. at 5 (noting “that the Seventh Circuit has recognized that Black undermines 
its position”); see, e.g., 394 U.S. at 707-08 (“Some early cases found the willfulness re-
quirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with ‘an apparent deter-
mination to carry them into execution.’ The majority below seemed to agree.  Perhaps this 
interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it.”); see, e.g., Jeffries, 692 
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1. Objective Intent: A Reasonable Person’s Reaction 
The objective intent standard focuses on whether a reasonable person in the 
place of the individual who received a form of speech would feel threatened.76  
The circuits that focus on the objective intent standard note that the reasonable 
person standard is appropriate “[b]ecause these social harms flow from the 
communicated threat itself and do not depend on the specific intent of the 
speaker.”77  However, this is not the only form in which the objective standard 
exists.78  Rather, the perspective of the reasonable person can replace that of the 
speaker, the listener, or a “neutral” reasonable person.79 
                                                                                                             
F.3d at 477-78 (instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether 
in light of the context a reasonable person would believe that the statement was made as a 
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1026 
(holding that a specific intent to carry out a threat is required to prosecute, where the threat’s 
“language and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to” 
constitute more than protected speech). 
 75 See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (“Some early cases found the willfulness re-
quirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with ‘an apparent deter-
mination to carry them into execution.’  The majority below seemed to agree.  Perhaps this 
interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it.”); see, e.g., 692 F.3d at 
477-78 (The jury was instructed to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether in 
light of the context a reasonable person would believe that the statement was made as a 
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., 534 F.2d at 1026 (holding 
that a specific intent to carry out a threat is required to prosecute, where the threat’s “lan-
guage and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to” con-
stitute more than protected speech). 
 76 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 2-3 (stating that the Third Circuit looks to 
“whether the defendant intended to threaten someone was irrelevant: As the government 
explained, ‘it doesn’t matter what he thinks.’  All that mattered was whether ‘the defendant 
intentionally ma[d]e a statement…under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted’ as a threat”); G. Robert Blakey & 
Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 
2002 BYU L. Rev. 829, 938, 939, n. 328 (2002) (discussing the interpretations of the objec-
tive test in true threat analysis). 
 77 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 2-3 (stating that the Third Circuit looks 
to “whether the defendant intended to threaten someone was irrelevant: As the government 
explained, ‘it doesn’t matter what he thinks.’ All that mattered was whether ‘the defendant 
intentionally ma[d]e a statement . . . under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted’ as a threat” (quoting United States v. 
Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991))); Blakey & Murray, supra note 76, at 993 (citing 
Caleb Mason, Framing Context, Anonymous Internet Speech, and Intent: New Uncertainty 
About the Constitutional Test for True Threats, 41 SW. L. REV. 43, 46-48 (2011)). 
 78 See id. at 938 n. 328 (discussing the interpretations of the objective test in true threat 
analysis). 
 79 See id. 
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2. Subjective Intent to Post: A Reasonable Person Knows That They Are 
Placing Speech Into A Forum 
The subjective intent to post standard continues to recognize that the harm 
comes from the speech, and not from the intent of the speaker. Furthermore, 
the standard adds another level of analysis.80  Circuits that utilize the subjective 
intent to speak standard focus on whether the speaker “[was] knowingly speak-
ing.”81  The standard also considers whether a reasonable speaker would know 
that they are placing speech into interstate or foreign commerce.82 
This standard permits great leeway for judges and juries to criminalize 
speech.  Speech that another person disagrees with, does not like, or does not 
understand, for example, could be outlawed.83  The ambiguity of such a test 
could lead to inconsistency and unfairness.  Those who accidentally post a rant 
on social media that was intended for therapeutic purposes may be protected 
should they be able to prove that they actually had no intent to publish the 
speech;84 however, those who intentionally post rap lyrics, which are some-
times violent or degrading, could be easily convicted. 
This issue is even more problematic when considering what is lost in trans-
lation between the written and spoken word.  For example, a current case pend-
ing in Texas arose from a miscommunication between two teenagers in a video 
game chat-room.85  The incident began when one of the teenagers called the 
other “crazy” in response to what the other had said about the video game.86  
The other teen replied sarcastically and stated, “Yeah, I’m crazy; I’m going to 
                                                
 80 See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (“Some early cases found the willfulness re-
quirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with ‘an apparent deter-
mination to carry them into execution.’ The majority below seemed to agree.  Perhaps this 
interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it.”); see, e.g., Jeffries, 692 
F.3d at 477-78 (instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether 
in light of the context a reasonable person would believe that the statement was made as a 
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1026 
(holding that because of First Amendment concerns, a specific intent to carry out a threat is 
required to prosecute). 
 81 See, e.g., 394 U.S. at 707-08 (“Some early cases found the willfulness requirement 
met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with ‘an apparent determination to 
carry them into execution.’ The majority below seemed to agree. Perhaps this interpretation 
is correct, although we have grave doubts about it.”); see, e.g., 692 F.3d at 477-78 (instruct-
ing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether in light of the context a 
reasonable person would believe that the statement was made as a serious expression of 
intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., 534 F.2d at 1026 (holding that because of First 
Amendment concerns, a specific intent to carry out a threat is required to prosecute). 
 82 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 83 Id. at 332. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39, at 9. 
 86 Id. at 9-10. 
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shoot up a kindergarten and eat one of their still beating hearts.”87  While this 
statement was clearly made in poor taste, both teenagers understood it to be 
sarcasm.88  However, a Canadian woman observing the chat, who clearly did 
not understand the sarcasm, proceeded to report the teenager to the authori-
ties.89  This teenager now faces criminal charges for a true threat simply be-
cause he knowingly placed sarcastic speech to an individual into interstate 
commerce and a third party misunderstood the speech as a threat.90  Should an 
individual be convicted of a crime for having what many would believe to 
simply be poor taste? 
3. Subjective Intent to Threaten: The Speaker’s Intent Is To Threaten Another 
The final true threat analysis standard is the subjective intent to threaten.91  
This test focuses on whether the speaker knowingly made a statement.92  Addi-
                                                
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 10. 
 90 Id. at 9. This scenario also demonstrates the issues caused by the objective intent test 
in true threat analysis without more, as an individual who saw the written speech, who could 
arguably be considered to be reasonable, misunderstood the sarcastic speech as a threat. 
 91 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19 (stating that the Fourth Circuit confirms 
that “18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires a showing that a threat was intended” (citing United States 
v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1966))); Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra 19, at 2-
3 
[T]the Ninth Circuit resolved any uncertainty that might remain from its previous 
practice by holding that, under Black, ‘only intentional threats are criminally pun-
ishable consistent with the First Amendment’… that court held, ‘the subjective 
test set forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure 
speech’; it is ‘not sufficient that objective observers would reasonably perceive 
such speech as a threat.’ 
(citing United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-1117 (2011)); see also id. at 5 
(“[T]hat the Seventh Circuit has recognized that Black undermines its position.” (citing 
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (2008))); see United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 
679-80 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that because the word “knowingly” is included in 18 
U.S.C. § 875(c), proof of culpability that “exceeds a mere transgression of an objective 
standard of acceptable behavior…[such as] negligence [or] recklessness” is required). 
 92 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19 (stating that the Fourth Circuit confirms 
that “18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires a showing that a threat was intended” (citing United States 
v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1966))); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Elonis, 
134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-983) 
[T]the Ninth Circuit resolved any uncertainty that might remain from its previous 
practice by holding that, under Black, ‘only intentional threats are criminally pun-
ishable consistent with the First Amendment’… that court held, ‘the subjective 
test set forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure 
speech’; it is ‘not sufficient that objective observers would reasonably perceive 
such speech as a threat.’ 
(citing United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-1117 (2011)); see also id. at 5 
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tionally, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the speak-
er not only intended to make the statement, but also intended the target of the 
statement to feel threatened.93 
While this standard appears to be more protective of speech, it still leaves 
great ambiguity.94  As Justice Ginsburg pointed out during oral arguments in 
the case of Elonis v. United States: 
How does one prove what’s in somebody else’s mind? This case, the standard was 
would a reasonable person think that the words would put someone in fear, and rea-
sonable people can make that judgment.  But how would the government prove 
whether this threat in the mind of the threatener was genuine?95 
The Court must strike a balance between the protection of free speech and 
prosecution of true threats in their ultimate decision of which standard of intent 
to adopt. 
IV. ELONIS V. UNITED STATES: A CASE STUDY 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Elonis v. United States on De-
cember 1, 2014, to consider the three possible intent tests for true threat analy-
sis.96  The facts of this case make it ideal for the consideration of these tests. 
                                                                                                             
(“[T]hat the Seventh Circuit has recognized that Black undermines its position.” (citing 
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (2008))); see 853 F.2d at 679-80 (explaining that 
because the word “knowingly” is included in 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), proof of culpability that 
“exceeds a mere transgression of an objective standard of acceptable behavior…[such as] 
negligence [or] recklessness” is required). 
 93 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19 (stating that the Fourth Circuit confirms 
that “18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires a showing that a threat was intended” (citing United States 
v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1966))); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Elonis, 
134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-983) 
[T]he Ninth Circuit resolved any uncertainty that might remain from its previous 
practice by holding that, under Black, ‘only intentional threats are criminally punish-
able consistent with the First Amendment’… that court held, ‘the subjective test set 
forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech’; it is 
‘not sufficient that objective observers would reasonably perceive such speech as a 
threat.’ 
(citing United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-1117 (2011)); see also id. at 5 
(“[T]hat the Seventh Circuit has recognized that Black undermines its position.” (citing 
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (2008))); United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 
1139 (10th. Cir. 2005); Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 1225, 1236 (2006). 
 94 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Elonis, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-
983), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-
983_bq7d.pdf. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 3. 
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A. Elonis v. United States: Factual Background 
In May 2010, Anthony Elonis separated from his wife, who moved out of 
their home with their two children.97  Subsequently, Elonis, a former of em-
ployee of Dorney Park, an amusement park in Pennsylvania, began experienc-
ing difficulties at work98 and was ultimately fired.99  
In response, Mr. Elonis took to his public social media account on Face-
book,100 where he made a series of posts that appeared to be threats.101  Mr. 
Elonis’s posts targeted a variety of individuals, including his wife, Dorney 
Park Amusement Park (his former employer), an unspecified kindergarten 
class, the Pennsylvania State Police and Berks County Sheriff’s Department, 
and a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent who began to investigate 
the case once the posts were brought to the FBI’s attention.102  Several of these 
posts were in the form of rap lyrics written by Anthony Elonis.103 
                                                
 97 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 98 See id.; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 6 (detailing that Elonis was 
sent home from work on several occasions because he was too upset about his separation 
from his wife to work). 
 99 See 730 F.3d at 324; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 8-9 (explain-
ing that the petitioner had jokingly posted a picture with a friend in halloween costumes for 
a “haunted-house-themed event,” and it was seen and interpreted as a threat by the Chief of 
Dorney Park Patrol, causing Elonis to be released from his position). 
 100 730 F.3d at 324. 
 101 See id. at 324-26; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 9-12 
Moles.  Didn’t I tell y’all I had several?  Y’all saying I had access to keys for the 
fucking gates, that I have sinister plans for all my friends and must have taken home 
a couple.  Y’all think it’s too dark and foggy to secure your facility for a man as mad 
as me.  You see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main attraction.  Whoever 
thought the Halloween haunt could be so fucking scary? . . . Hi, I’m Tone Elonis. 
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? It’s illegal. It’s 
indirect criminal contempt. It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say. 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just telling you that it’s il-
legal for me to say I want to kill my wife. I’m not actually saying it. I’m just letting 
you know that it’s illegal for me to/say that./It’s kind of like a public service. I’m let-
ting you know so that you don’t accidentally go out and say something like that Um, 
what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really think someone out 
there should kill my wife./That’s illegal. Very, very illegal. But not illegal to say 
with a mortar launcher. Because that’s its own sentence. It’s an incomplete sentence 
but it may have noth-/ing to do with the sentence before that.  So that’s/perfectly fi-
ne. Perfectly legal . . . Art is about pushing limits.  I’m willing to go to jail for my 
constitutional rights.  Are you? [including a link to the original video]. 
Id. 
 102 730 F.3d at 326. 
 103 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 6-7. 
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B. Elonis v. United States: Procedural History 
On December 8, 2010, Anthony Elonis was arrested.104  He was charged 
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), “[by] transmitting in interstate commerce 
communications containing a threat to injure the person of another.”105  A 
grand jury indicted Mr. Elonis on five counts of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) violations 
based on the “threatening” posts he made on his public Facebook account.106 
Citing Virginia v. Black, Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment and argued 
that “a subjective intent to threaten was required under the true threat excep-
tion to the First Amendment and that his statements were not threats but were 
protected speech.”107  The district court denied his motion to dismiss, and stated 
that the issues Elonis raised were matters of fact to be determined by a jury.108 
At his jury trial, Anthony Elonis testified in his own defense.109  The gov-
ernment responded by calling witnesses to demonstrate how a reasonable per-
son would view Elonis’s posts.110  These “reasonable person[s],” however, “had 
little familiarity with Facebook, no familiarity with rap music, and viewed 
[Elonis’s] posts in isolation, largely divorced from users’ comments and his 
surrounding posts.”111  Without context for Elonis’s musical taste and sense of 
satire, the government’s witnesses only considered the words’ literal mean-
ing.112  Moreover, these “reasonable people” were “unfamiliar with the mean-
ing of the emoticons petitioner used to provide his Facebook posts context.”113  
The jury convicted him of disseminating true threats through interstate com-
merce on four of the five counts of which he was accused.114 
Elonis then filed a post-trial Motion to Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), and then moved for a New 
Trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), to Arrest Judgment un-
der Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34(b), and/or Dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).115  The district court denied these motions.116 
                                                
 104 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 327. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 17. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 17-18. 
 113 Id. Emoticons are computer or keyboard generated faces, such as smiley faces, that 
are used in written Internet speech to assist with the demonstration of the writer’s attitude. 
 114 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327 (noting that the jury did not convict Anthony Elonis of ad-
ministering a true threat via interstate commerce based on his postings on his public Face-
book account regarding Dorney Park and its patrons). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld Elonis’s 
convictions, citing the Court’s reasonable speaker standard, as articulated in 
United States v. Kosma.117  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on June 16, 2014, in part to consider the differing intent standards in true threat 
analysis.118 
V. ANALYSIS: TRUE THREATS AND A NEW TEST 
The intent standard used most often by courts in recent years is the objective 
intent test.119  The objective intent test asks whether a reasonable person would 
be put in genuine fear for their safety based on their receipt of the speech in 
question.120  This analysis constitutes an important portion of any true threat 
test. 
However, there are other important factors that should be considered in true 
threat analysis, such as the analysis of whether it is feasible for the threat to 
                                                                                                             
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the indict-
ment correctly tracked the language of the statute and stated the nature of the threat, 
the date of the threat and the victim of the threat . . . the objective intent standard 
conformed with Third Circuit precedent… [the] evidence supported the jury’s find-
ing that the statements in Count 3 and Count 5 were true threats . . . [and] the jury in-
struction presuming communications over the internet were transmitted through in-
terstate commerce was supported by our precedent in United States v. MacEwan, 
445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Id. 
 117 See id. at 327-28, 332 (detailing that true threat analysis in the Third Circuit looks to 
whether a statement could be foreseen by a reasonable person to be interpreted by the 
speech’s recipient as a legitimate threat of bodily injury or death). 
 118 Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 119 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 2-3 
[W]hether the defendant intended to threaten someone was irrelevant: As the gov-
ernment explained, ‘it doesn’t matter what he thinks.’  All that mattered was whether 
‘the defendant intentionally ma[d]e a statement…under such circumstances wherein 
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted’ as a 
threat. 
(internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) 
(“Some early cases found the willfulness requirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered 
the charged words with ‘an apparent determination to carry them into execution.’ The ma-
jority below seemed to agree. Perhaps this interpretation is correct, although we have grave 
doubts about it.”); see, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(instructing the jury to convict Jeffries under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if “whether in light of the 
context a reasonable person would believe that the statement was made as a serious expres-
sion of intent to inflict bodily injury”); see, e.g., United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 
1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that despite First Amendment concerns, a specific intent to 
carry out a threat is not specifically required to prosecute).  
 120 Gene Policinski, Examining the New Importance of ‘Where’ We Speak, NEWSEUM 
INST. (July 25, 2014), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/examining-the-new-
importance-of-where-we-speak. 
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actually be executed, which affects the reasonability of the inflicted fear.121  For 
instance, “[w]ishing aloud that a certain person would be struck by a mete-
or…may be crude and tactless, but clearly the speaker cannot make that oc-
cur.”122  Furthermore, to be a true threat, the speech has to be directed to a cer-
tain person or identifiable group.123 
Rather than intent, the requirement that speech be directed at an identifiable 
person or group determines whether a true threat exists.  This is because a true 
threat, under the objective intent test, is based on the reasonable reaction of the 
recipient of the speech.124  On written social media forums, such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and Myspace, there is no ability for a recipient to recognize body lan-
guage, tone of voice, or even handwriting style.  These verbal and nonverbal 
cues have previously helped individuals (and courts) decipher whether a threat 
is serious.125  Because the true meaning of text on social media is lost in trans-
lation, the Supreme Court should examine the directness of the threat, rather 
than the subjective or objective intent of the speaker. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court should adopt a true threat analysis test, which considers both the direct-
ness of the speech and the objective intent of the speech’s recipient.  This two-
fold test would allow strong protections for free speech while simplifying the 
analysis for unprotected true threats. 
                                                
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a juvenile-court conviction of a high 
school student for writing rap lyrics it said were a ‘true threat’ of physical violence . 
. . [because] the lyrics were written specifically for a fellow student, delivered to her 
and she was, the court said, ‘intensely frightened and upset’ by the threat and be-
lieved the juvenile might follow through on the threat because he had a criminal rec-
ord . . . in 2012, a federal appeals court in California refused to reinstate the convic-
tion of an Arizona man accused of planning a Super Bowl massacre, saying a ram-
bling ‘manifesto’ did not constitute a threat to people, since it was addressed to me-
dia outlets not specific persons, and that man’s threat to ‘test the theory that bullets 
speak louder than words’ was not sufficient to support a conviction under federal 
law. 
Id. 
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A. The True Threat Test: Directness and Objective Intent as a Holistic 
Approach 
1. Level 1: “Status Update” 
To determine the directness of a possible true threat on social media, it is 
important to consider the three major types of social media posts.126  The first 
level of posting to Facebook is that of the “status update.”  This is a broad form 
of speech that, based on an individual’s privacy settings, allows members of 
Facebook to read what the user wrote.127 
This level is akin to an individual speaking on the street with a megaphone.  
Assuming that a user employs the default Facebook privacy settings, when the 
user posts a status update to their own Facebook page, the entire Facebook 
community has the ability to view that post, even if the post is geared toward 
or directly names only one individual.128 Thus, it is similar to someone who is 
standing on a street corner making verbal threats through a megaphone against 
an individual that they feel wronged them.  There is no evidence that the indi-
vidual targeted by the speaker knows or will ever know of the threat.129  In true 
threat analysis, an individual must physically receive the speech in order to feel 
threatened.130  Thus, it can be argued that this style of speech is more of a ther-
apeutic rant and therefore less likely to be a true threat.131 
Under the holistic directness test argued for here, if the disputed speech is 
posted as a status update, a jury would receive instructions such as: A true 
threat has occurred if a reasonable person, hearing this public statement shout-
ed to no person in particular on the street, would believe the speech to be an 
                                                
 126 Because the case that is being used to demonstrate the possibility of analyzing a true 
threat through the directness of the speech involved posts to Facebook, Facebook will be 
used to represent all written social media websites. 
 127 An individual can set their individual settings generally and per post to permit all of 
Facebook, just his or her “friends,” or those with whom the individual has linked his or her 
account, just his or her friends and friends of friends, just select individuals, or only the 
individual him or herself to see their Facebook page and each individual post. Choose Who 
You Share With, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/459934584025324/ (last visit-
ed Feb. 1, 2015). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Just because a person is capable of reading a Facebook post, does not mean they will 
read it. Id. (explaining a Facebook user’s ability to customize the audience for their posts). 
 130 Policinski, supra note 120 (noting that the objective test for true threats focuses on 
the reaction of the recipient to the speech). 
 131 Richard Wolf, Supreme Court to Hear Case on Facebook Threats, USA TODAY (June 
16, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/16/supreme-
court-facebook-threats-free-speech/10326233/; see also United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 
1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that offensive speech made in jest or as rhetoric should 
remain protected). 
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actual, feasible, and reliable threat of bodily injury or death.132  By creating jury 
instructions that utilize the directness test, a jury will be better able to evaluate 
the true meaning of the speech in question, as the speech will be removed from 
the intangible Internet and considered in a more tangible, generally understood 
context. 
2. Level 2: “Timeline Post” 
The next level of placing speech in social media is “posting to someone’s 
timeline.”133  When an individual posts on someone’s timeline, only those who 
are able to view the recipient user’s posts on that timeline can see the speech.134  
Writing on a “timeline” is similar to writing on an individual’s white-board on 
the outside of their college dorm door.135  It is a public message to an individual 
that others may also read.136 
This is analogous to speaking to an individual within a group of people.  
When speaking in a group setting, it is more likely that factors affecting the 
reasonability of the speech truly constituting a serious threat of bodily injury or 
death would be known.137  In a group, other individuals may recognize that the 
speaker has violent tendencies or can be spontaneous in their actions.  Depend-
ing on the surrounding circumstances, such as the specific language used and 
the criminal record of the speaker, this could be considered direct enough to 
warrant a true threat prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).138  Therefore, under 
the directness test, if the disputed speech is posted on someone’s wall, a jury 
would receive instructions such as: A true threat occurred if a reasonable per-
son, having personal direct or indirect knowledge of the speaker and hearing 
this statement made in a group, would believe it to be an actual and feasible 
threat of bodily injury or death.139  Creating jury instructions based on the di-
rectness of the speech and the objective standard of a reasonable recipient will 
                                                
 132 Cf. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the jury instruc-
tions provided by the Elonis trial judge). 
 133 How do I post something on someone else’s Timeline?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/173433019380025 (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 134 Id. 
 135 See generally What is Timeline, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1462219934017791?sr=1&query=What%20is%20a%20Ti
meline&sid=0hjIUy5PLtnGvjtBx (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
 136 How do I post something on someone else’s Timeline?, supra note 133. 
 137 Brief for the United States at 53, Elonis v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (Sept. 29, 
2014) (No. 13-983). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Cf. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the jury instruc-
tions provided by the Elonis trial judge). 
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remove much of the ambiguity of true threat analysis for Facebook timeline 
posts, while still allowing a jury to weigh the facts of the case at hand.140 
3. Level 3: “Private Message” 
The third and final level of posting speech to social media outlets such as 
Facebook is  “private messaging” an individual.141  Private messaging is useful 
when one wishes to send a message to an individual on Facebook, but does not 
want other individuals to read what is sent; this is analogous to sending an e-
mail or a text message.142  It is sent directly to the individual recipient and can-
not be viewed by anyone other than the individual who wrote the message and 
the individual who received it.143  This is similar to the note passed in a high 
school in Arkansas or the letter that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) was originally designed 
to regulate.144  Therefore, it is likely that speech which appears threatening and 
is delivered via a system of private messaging will likely constitute a true 
threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) as “any communication containing . . . any 
threat to injure the person.”145  Under the directness test, if the disputed speech 
is delivered through a private message, a jury would receive instructions such 
as: A true threat has occurred if a reasonable person, knowing the speaker, or 
                                                
 140 Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Considers “True Threats” and the First Amend-
ment, VERDICT (Dec. 10, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/10/supreme-court-
considers-true-threats-first-amendment. 
 141 William McCoy, What is the Meaning of PM in Facebook?, EHOW.COM, 
http://www.ehow.com/info_10030591_meaning-pm-facebook.html (last visited Feb. 3, 
2015). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Who Can See My Messages, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/212388195458335 (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
 144 Policinski, supra note 120 
In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a juvenile-court conviction of a high 
school student for writing rap lyrics it said were a ‘true threat’ of physical violence . 
. . [because] the lyrics were written specifically for a fellow student, delivered to her 
and she was, the court said, ‘intensely frightened and upset’ by the threat and be-
lieved the juvenile might follow through on the threat because he had a criminal rec-
ord. 
Id.; see Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-274, 47 Stat. 649 
Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, 
shall knowingly deposit or cause to be deposited in any post office or station . . . any 
written or printed letter or other communication . . . addressed to any other person, 
and containing any threat (1) to injure the person, property, or reputation of the ad-
dressee or of another . . . or (2) to kidnap any person, or (3) to accuse the addressee 
or any other person of a crime, or containing any demand or request for ransom or 
reward for the real ease of any kidnapped person, shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
Id. 
 145 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
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who has never had any contact with the speaker, received this speech directly 
and understood the speech to be an actual and feasible threat of bodily injury 
or death.146  This jury instruction allows individuals to be prosecuted for their 
threatening speech, even if the recipient has had no prior contact with the 
speaker.147  At the same time, this instruction allows for the protection of free 
speech, as the jury will be able to consider the facts in this context more easily. 
The significance of this directness test for true threats, as explained through the 
three major formats for speaking on social media platforms, can be demon-
strated by its application to the case of Elonis v. United States. 
B. Application of the Directness Test: Elonis v. United States 
As detailed in Elonis v. United States, Anthony Elonis placed speech into in-
terstate commerce through written posts on Facebook.148  The five charges 
brought against Elonis149 as analyzed by the holistic approach of the directness 
test, encompassing the directness of the threat and objective intent, demon-
strate the ease with which this test allows for a simplified approach to true 
threat analysis while maintaining the role of the jury in criminal law.  Thus, 
this analysis, in which each of Elonis’s five charges will be considered inde-
pendently, demonstrates why the Supreme Court should understand the test for 
true threats to consider the directness of the threat in conjunction with objec-
tive intent. 
1. Count 1: Anthony Elonis’s Threat Against an Unspecified Kindergarten 
Class 
The first charge brought against Anthony Elonis was that he allegedly 
threatened to shoot an unspecified kindergarten class.150  On November 16, 
2010, Anthony Elonis created a post on his public Facebook webpage that stat-
ed: 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough/I’m checking out and making a name for my-
self/Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school 
shooting ever imagined/And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten 
class/The only question is…which one?151 
                                                
 146 Cf. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the jury instruc-
tions provided by the Elonis trial judge). 
 147 Colb, supra note 140 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003)). 
 148 730 F.3d at 326-27. 
 149 Id. at 326. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
418 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
Because Anthony Elonis’s Facebook page was public, anyone with a Face-
book account could access it, including the FBI agent who was monitoring 
Elonis’s Facebook profile.152  The way in which these rap lyrics were posted is 
similar to an individual rapping on a street corner.  Therefore, a jury consider-
ing this charge, under the suggested true threat analysis, would receive a jury 
instruction such as, Anthony Elonis committed a true threat if a reasonable 
person walking down the street, having heard this speech being rapped to no 
person in particular, would believe the speech to be an actual, feasible, and 
reliable threat of bodily harm or death.153 
A jury would decide whether Elonis was merely “venting his feelings 
[through] rap lyrics” on Facebook, or whether his post instead constituted a 
true threat.154  Due to the many high profile school shootings that have recently 
occurred,155 it is possible that a jury could find that a reasonable person would 
consider Elonis’s words to be a true threat.156  However, while the post men-
tions “elementary schools,” it does not target a specific individual or group of 
individuals.157  Instead, it mentions a kindergarten class, but does not name a 
particular class or school.158  Because the statement “only conveys a vague 
timeline or condition,” it is not likely to be considered a true threat.159  If the 
post had included more detail about an elementary school in the area or shown 
Elonis’s connection to a particular school, it is possible that a jury would find 
Elonis’s statement specific enough to be recognized as a true threat. 
Although Elonis’s speech was inappropriate and would likely be considered 
offensive to a reasonable person, it does not mean that this speech is inherently 
a true threat.  This is because without more, inappropriate speech does not con-
stitute a true threat.160  The United States Supreme Court has said that unpopu-
                                                
 152 Id. 
 153 Cf. id. at 327 (quoting the jury instructions provided by the Elonis trial judge). 
 154 Irin Carmon, Supreme Court dilemma: Was Facebook rant real threat or rap lyrics?, 
MSNBC (Dec. 1, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/supreme-court-rap-lyric-
argument-facebook-threat-case. 
 155 Richard A. Serrano, Mass shootings in U.S. have tripled in recent years, FBI says, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-nn-na-
mass-shootings-fbi-20140924-story.html (mentioning recent shootings such as the shootings 
in the Aurora movie theater and the elementary school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in Newtown, CT in 2012). 
 156 Threats of Violence Against Individuals, JUSTIA, 
http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/43-threats-of-violence.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2015). 
 157 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326. 
 158 Id. (“‘I’m checking out and making a name for/ myself Enough elementary schools in 
a/ ten mile radius to initiate the most hei-/ nous school shooting ever imagined/ And hell 
hath no fury like a crazy man/ in a kindergarten class/ The only question is . . . which 
one?’”). 
 159 Id. at 334. 
 160 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (explaining that the burning of 
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lar or controversial speech deserves First Amendment protection.161  Therefore, 
Elonis’s speech should be protected and he should not have been convicted of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) on this count. 
The combination of directness and objective intent allows the jury to objec-
tively apply the facts and external context to the issue at hand, rather than sole-
ly focusing on the tasteless speech itself.162 
2. Count 2: Anthony Elonis’s Threat Against Dorney Park 
A second charge was brought against Elonis for a Facebook statement made 
about Dorney Park and its patrons.163  Two days after Anthony Elonis was fired 
from his job at Dorney Park, he posted as a status update: 
Moles.  Didn’t I tell ya’ll I had several? Ya’ll saying I had access to keys for the fuck-
ing gates, that I have sinister plans for all my friends and must have taken home a 
couple. Ya’ll think it’s too dark and foggy to secure your facility from a man as mad 
as me. You see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main attraction.  Whoever 
thought the Halloween haunt could be so fucking scary?164 
Similar to Elonis’s alleged threat against an unspecified kindergarten class, 
this speech was posted to the general public as a status update.165  Therefore, a 
jury would receive instructions such as: A true threat was committed if a rea-
sonable person walking down the street, having heard this speech yelled to no 
person in particular, would believe the speech to be an actual, feasible, and 
reliable threat of bodily harm or death.166 
Given that Elonis targeted a specific location, in the context of these instruc-
tions, a jury may find that Elonis’s words are a true threat.167  However, while 
                                                                                                             
a cross alone does not constitute a true threat without something more, there must be intent 
to act unlawfully). 
 161 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, 562 U.S. 443, slip op. at 12 (2011) (noting 
that because “Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that 
speech is entitled to ‘special protection’” and “cannot be restricted simply because it is up-
setting or arouses contempt”). 
 162 See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that reasona-
ble-person standard would understand that “I’ll tear your head off” has a different meaning 
when it comes from a professional athlete than when it comes from a serial killer because, 
“instead of ignoring context, it forces jurors to examine the circumstances in which a state-
ment is made”). 
 163 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326. 
 164 Id. at 324. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Cf. id. at 327 (quoting the jury instructions provided by the Elonis trial judge). 
 167 See Policinski, supra note 120 
In 2012, a federal appeals court in California . . . [said] a rambling “manifesto” did 
not constitute a threat to people, since it was addressed to media outlets not specific 
persons, and that man’s threat to ‘test the theory that bullets speak louder than 
words’ was not sufficient to support a conviction under federal law. 
Id. 
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this post appears to be aimed at Dorney Park, Elonis’s former employer, and its 
patrons, this post is more analogous to the individual who threatened a Super 
Bowl Massacre.168  This statement is similar to that made by the speaker in the 
Super Bowl Massacre threat case because it appears to be an unspecific “ram-
bling manifesto”169 that does not actually or specifically “threaten” to do any-
thing, but rather, states that Elonis has keys to the facilities and implies he may 
utilize them.  Therefore, a neutral reasonable person hearing this statement on 
the street will probably not consider these words to be a true threat, and a jury 
could also reasonably decide not to convict Elonis on this count.170  Thus, the 
jury likely found correctly on this charge against Elonis.171  In considering dis-
puted texts in this context, a jury relies on the actual facts of the case to judge 
whether Elonis’s speech was actually a true threat, rather than focusing on the 
crudeness of the language itself.172 
3. Count 3: Anthony Elonis’s Threats Against the FBI 
Similarly, a fifth count brought against Anthony Elonis was in regard to rap 
lyrics he posted to Facebook regarding the FBI173: 
You know your shits ridiculous/when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door/Little 
Agent Lady stood so close/Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost/Pull 
my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat/Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the 
arms of her partner/[laughter]/So the next time you knock, you best be serving a war-
rant/And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at it/Cause little did 
ya’ll know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb/Why do you think it took me so long to get 
dressed with no shoes on?/I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and pat me 
down/Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all goin’/[BOOM!]174 
These lyrics were posted as a status update on Elonis’s public Facebook 
page.175  Using the intent to threaten standard of the Third Circuit, a jury found 
that this text constituted a true threat.176  The jury instruction stated: 
                                                
 168 Cf. id. (noting that a man’s conviction was not reinstated because a “rambling ‘mani-
festo’” about a Super Bowl Massacre does not reach the level of a true threat). 
 169 Id. (noting that a federal appeals court found that a “rambling ‘manifesto’” is not a 
true threat because “it was addressed to media outlets, not specific persons, and that man’s 
threat to ‘test the theory that bullets speak louder than words’” was not enough to support a 
conviction). 
 170 See Elonis, 730 F.3d at 332 (applying the objective intent standard, which both ad-
dresses harm caused by true threats and protects “non-threatening speech”). 
 171 Id. at 327 (stating that Elonis was not convicted on this charge). 
 172 Cf. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that the rea-
sonable-person standard “forces jurors to examine the circumstances in which a statement is 
made” and does not allow jurors to ignore context (citing United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 
F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
 173 730 F.3d at 326. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 327. 
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A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a 
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that 
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life 
of an individual.177 
However, when considering Elonis’s statement under the directness test, it is 
unlikely that a jury would come to the same conclusion.178 
Under the directness analysis for true threats, a jury would be asked to con-
sider whether a neutral reasonable person, hearing Elonis’s lyrics rapped on the 
street towards no specific individual, would believe that the rapper intended to 
actually physically injure or kill the FBI agent mentioned, whether his “threat” 
was feasible, and whether the threat should be relied upon.179  Considering that 
many rap lyrics are violent in nature and are often geared toward specific indi-
viduals, it is unlikely that a neutral reasonable bystander would consider these 
lyrics to constitute a true threat.180 While there is always the possibility that the 
jury will find in the alternative, the decision is the jury’s prerogative and will 
depend on their personal experiences and the facts of the case.  The ability of a 
jury to take into account their own personal experiences in considering the 
facts of the case before them is imperative to the nature of a criminal trial.181  
The proposed true threat analysis, which combines directness with objective 
intent, is appropriate because it respects jury deliberation and experience while 
preventing a rogue jury from convicting a defendant solely based on the of-
fense they felt by the statement in question.182 
4. Count 4: Anthony Elonis’s Threats Against a Pennsylvania Police 
Department 
A fourth count was brought against Elonis for a message he posted to Face-
book “threatening” the Pennsylvania State Police and Sheriff’s Department.183  
This statement read: 
                                                
 177 Id. 
 178 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (stating that a true threat is a state-
ment where a speaker directs a threat to a person or groups of persons with the intent of 
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death (emphasis added) (citing Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969))). 
 179 See, e.g., id. at 360 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the 
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to person or groups of persons 
with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” (emphasis added)). 
 180 See, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A juror cannot 
permissibly ignore contextual cues in deciding whether a ‘reasonable person’ would per-
ceive the charged conduct ‘as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.’” 
(citing United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
 181 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 182 DeBauche, supra note 66, at 1013-14. 
 183 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 333 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket/Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?/Try to 
enforce an Order/That was improperly granted in the first place/Me thinks the judge 
needs an education on true threat jurisprudence/And prison time will add zeroes to my 
settlement/Which you won’t see a lick/Because you suck dog dick in front of chil-
dren/***/And if worse comes to worse/I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the 
state police and the sheriff’s department/[link: Freedom of Speech, 
www.wikipedia.org]184 
This statement was posted as a status update to Elonis’s public Facebook 
page.185 
The district court jury and appellate court determined that a reasonable jury 
could have determined that this statement was a true threat.  Therefore, Antho-
ny Elonis was convicted of threatening a police station.186  However, when 
considering this statement under the directness and objective intent test, the 
outcome is not as clear.187 
Under the directness test, a jury would receive instructions that if a reasona-
ble person, hearing this rap on a street corner, would consider the statement to 
be an actual threat against the police station, than a true threat exists.188  Using 
the directness and objective intent test, a jury could find, from the perspective 
of a reasonable person, that the speaker is angry and ranting using hyperbolic 
speech.189  However, given recent events such as Eric Frein’s recent ambushing 
of police officers,190 it is also possible that a jury could find that a reasonable 
person would consider this a true threat.191  Furthermore, unlike the Super Bowl 
Massacre threat, these rap lyrics specify who the possible threat is against and 
what the speaker intends to do to the specified individuals, furthering the like-
lihood that this post is a true threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).192 Thus, it is like-
ly Anthony Elonis should be convicted of a true threat under the directness test 
for his statement regarding police.  However, this issue could reasonably be 
                                                
 184 Id. at 333-34. 
 185 Id. at 333. 
 186 Id. at 334. 
 187 DeBauche, supra note 66, at 1016. 
 188 Id. at 1015-16. 
 189 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 328 (explaining that hyperbolic speech is not protected (citing 
Watts v. United States)). 
 190 Andrew Jauregui, Eric Frein Charged With Two Counts Of Terrorism, THE HUFFING-
TON POST (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/13/eric-frein-terrorism-
charges_n_6154674.html. 
 191 DeBauche, supra note 66, at 987. 
 192 Policinski, supra note 120 
[I]n 2012, a federal appeals court in California refused to reinstate the conviction of 
an Arizona man accused of planning a Super Bowl massacre, saying a rambling 
“manifesto” did not constitute a threat to people, since it was addressed to media 
outlets not specific persons, and that man’s threat to ‘test the theory that bullets 
speak louder than words’ was not sufficient to support a conviction under federal 
law. 
Id. 
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decided by a jury either way and thus permits the traditional criminal law jury 
system to function as intended.193 
5. Count 5: Anthony Elonis’s Threats Against His Wife 
The fifth count was brought against Anthony Elonis for a series of “threat-
ening” status updates that he posted on Facebook regarding his estranged 
wife.194  One such post stated: 
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife?  It’s illegal.  It’s 
indirect criminal contempt. It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say. 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just telling you that it’s ille-
gal for me to say I want to kill my wife.  I’m not actually saying it… Um, what’s in-
teresting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really think someone out there should 
kill my wife. That’s illegal. Very, very illegal. But not illegal to say with a mortar 
launcher. Because that’s its own sentence . . . .195 
The post then continued to “not” inform any specific individual how to kill 
Tara Elonis, Anthony’s estranged wife, with a mortar launcher, going so far as 
to use a keyboard generated model detailing where the mortar launcher should 
“not” be placed.196  While it could be argued that this is disturbing, similar to 
Elonis’s other two Facebook posts, this would likely be considered a therapeu-
tic rant.197  Not only is this post composed so that the maximum number of 
people can read it, making it analogous to an individual yelling on a street, but 
in addition, Elonis actually specifies that he intentionally crafted the speech to 
border on illegality.198 
A jury could consider this to be a true threat, because Elonis made such a 
point of “not” threatening his wife;199 however, it is likely that a neutral, rea-
sonable person hearing this shouted on a street corner, may find this speech to 
be protected.200  Moreover, while a specific individual is called out in this post, 
making it similar to the previously discussed juvenile criminal case in Arkan-
sas, it is also very unrealistic, as mortar launchers are not a common item 
available to the public.  Thus, this statement is unlikely to be a true threat.201 
                                                
 193 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (detailing that individuals have a right to a jury trial in crimi-
nal cases). 
 194 730 F.3d at 326. 
 195 Id. at 324-25. 
 196 Id. at 325. 
 197 Policinski, supra note 120. 
 198 730 F.3d at 324-25. 
 199 Id. at 325. 
 200 DeBauche, supra note 66, at 1015-16. 
 201 Policinski, supra note 120 
In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a juvenile-court conviction of a high 
school student for writing rap lyrics it said were a ‘true threat’ of physical violence . 
. . [because] the lyrics were written specifically for a fellow student, delivered to her 
and she was, the court said, ‘intensely frightened and upset’ by the threat and be-
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On the other hand, several of Elonis’s other statements regarding his ex-wife 
are not as straightforward.202  For instance, in October 2010, Elonis commented 
on the status update of his sister-in-law.203 Elonis’s sister-in-law had posted that 
she was going Halloween costume shopping with her niece and nephew, Elo-
nis’s two children.204  In response, Elonis commented, “Tell [my son] he should 
dress up as a Matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his costume would 
entail though.  Maybe [Tara Elonis’s] head on a stick?”205 
This statement mentions a specific individual, Elonis’s estranged wife, in 
the context of death.206  Moreover, it is more direct than a status update because 
Elonis is commenting on the status update of a specific person, in this case, his 
sister-in-law.207  Therefore, it is more direct than a status update, but, less direct 
than posting directly on someone’s wall. 
Here, the directness test would be similar to the test for statements posted on 
someone’s wall, because of the direct connection between two individuals in 
regard to a discussion of a third person.208  Therefore, the jury will be instructed 
to consider whether a reasonable person with direct or indirect personal 
knowledge of the speaker believes that the speaker actually intends to cause 
bodily harm or death to another in a way that is feasible.  Thus, in this case, it 
would be important for a jury to recognize that Elonis had no history of physi-
cal violence of which his sister-in-law was aware, when placing themselves as 
reasonable persons, in the place of the sister-in-law receiving the speech.209  In 
considering whether a reasonable person, familiar with the speaker and hearing 
Elonis’s statement in a group setting, would believe the statement to be an ac-
tual, feasible, and reliable threat of bodily harm or death, it is unlikely that the 
jury will determine the language in question constitutes a true threat. 
                                                                                                             
lieved the juvenile might follow through on the threat because he had a criminal rec-
ord . . . in 2012, a federal appeals court in California refused to reinstate the convic-
tion of an Arizona man accused of planning a Super Bowl massacre, saying a ram-
bling “manifesto” did not constitute a threat to people, since it was addressed to me-
dia outlets not specific persons, and that man’s threat to ‘test the theory that bullets 
speak louder than words’ was not sufficient to support a conviction under federal 
law. 
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Elonis’s statements are hyperbolic and exaggerated, akin to his comment 
about mortar launchers.210  It is highly unlikely that Elonis’s son would actually 
carry around his mother’s head on a stick, considering that there is no evidence 
that his son had issues with Tara Elonis, violent tendencies, or the capability of 
committing such an act.211  Had there been evidence demonstrating that Elonis 
or his son had issues with Tara Elonis or a violent history, this case may have 
turned out differently.212  Therefore, is it likely that this comment also does not 
constitute a true threat. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The jury’s ultimate decision of whether a Facebook post is a true threat is far 
less important than the jury’s decision-making process.  The current tests for 
true threats, focusing solely on intent or the reasonable person standard while 
ignoring other situational factors, creates ambiguity by focusing on the word’s 
literal meaning, rather than evaluating the words in context.213  A word’s mean-
ing may change completely when it is considered in context, rather than in iso-
lation.214  Therefore, it is imperative for a jury to consider the directness of 
speech as it allows for the recognition and comprehension of the context in 
which statements are made in true threat analysis. 
By permitting a jury to use the objective intent standard, which focuses on 
whether a reasonable person in the place of a speech recipient would feel 
threatened,215 or the specific intent standard, which focuses on whether a rea-
sonable person in the position of the speaker knowingly spoke or knowingly 
threatened,216 the jury is given too much censorship capability.217  The average 
person, in these positions, will likely censor speech that they disagree with, 
regardless of whether this is what a true reasonable person would do.218  This 
censorship is contrary to the intent of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which made it a 
crime to threaten, not offend, an individual in interstate or foreign commerce.219  
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Moreover, the exemptions to free speech were not intended to censor speech 
solely because an individual disagrees with it or is offended by it.220  Thus, it is 
clear that the division between the courts as to the proper standard for intent 
has harmed free speech. 
Instead of focusing solely on intent, directness should be the determinative 
factor in a true threat analysis.221  This allows for a greater degree of protection 
over free speech while still protecting victims of true threats.222  In their ruling 
on Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court should interpret the test for true 
threats to focus on the directness of the speech while considering the objective 
intent of the recipient. 
This is especially true when considering the different levels of speech on so-
cial media.223  Individuals on social media can censor speech on their own by 
refusing to view public pages that post speech in the way that Anthony Elonis 
did, or by “un-friending” or “un-following” individuals like Anthony Elonis.224  
Therefore, as individuals can censor such speech on their own, it follows that 
such censorship should further be removed from the thoughts of the jury dur-
ing true threat analysis.  When a jury considers speech, like that posted by An-
thony Elonis on Facebook, without context in an intangible location, the risk of 
restricting protected speech becomes too great.  Therefore, the test for true 
threats analysis should be changed so that directness is evaluated in combina-
tion with the objective intent of the recipient.  A revised true threat test would 
both uphold free speech protections and permit adequate prosecution for those 
who violate 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), thus maintaining the safety and well-being of 
the subjects of disputed speech. 
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